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Shocking or career-threatening tackles have been observed in various football 
competitions around the world. Every football league has its examples of 
crushing tackles which have left the victim with long-term suffering.1 The 
Major League Soccer in the United States (U.S.) is no exception.2 When the 
victim of such an incident decides to file a law suit to recover damages from 
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1 For instance, Alf-Inge Håland’s career ended due to the deliberate knee-high tackle by Roy 
Keane during the Manchester Derby in 2001. Another example is Axel Witsel’s leg-breaking 
horror tackle that put Anderlecht player Marcin Wasilewski out for almost an entire year.  
2 Remember Hristo Stoichkov’s leg-shattering tackle in 2003 during a game between D.C. 
United and American University. The tackle caused severe physical and psychological injuries 
to his opponent Freddy Llerena-Aspiazu. He filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court claiming 
damages from the former Bulgarian international whose tackle caused the injury.  
the wrongdoer, punitive damages might become available.3 The availability of 
punitive damages for football injuries in the United States raises the question 
whether awards for such damages can also be enforced in the European Union 
(EU). The vast majority of EU Member States traditionally adopts a hostile 
stance towards this controversial remedy. However, more recently a small 
number of countries have exhibited a more welcoming attitude. The article 
supports this new-found openness and attempts to solidify it by formulating a 
number of guiding principles that European judges can fall back on when 
confronted with American judgments containing punitive damages for liability 
for football injuries. Such a study might be particularly relevant considering 
the rising popularity of football in the U.S. and the transfers to major European 
football leagues going along with it.4  
 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND SPORT INJURIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Although not the main focus of this contribution, it is interesting to briefly 
recall the circumstances under which punitive damages become available in 
the U.S. following a crushing or career-ending tackle in football.5  
Contrary to compensatory or actual damages, punitive damages are not 
(primarily) intended to compensate the plaintiff for harm done. Punitive 
                                                 
3 For instance, Llerena-Aspiazu alleged that Stoitchkov’s tackle was the direct and the 
proximate result of the defendant’s recklessness. Llerena-Aspiazu further argued that 
Stoichkov's tackle constituted outrageous conduct that was malicious, wanton, reckless or in 
willful disregard of rights. Therefore, Llerena-Aspiazu sought $5 million in punitive damages 
from Stoichkov (Llerena-Aspiazu v. Anschutz D.C. Soccer L.L.C., et al., Case 1:06-cv-00343-
RWR, Complaint (U.D.D. 2006)). Although a financial settlement was eventually reached 
between Llerena-Aspiazu and Stoichkov (Llerena-Aspiazu v. Anschutz D.C. Soccer L.L.C., et 
al., Case 1:06-cv-00343-RWR, Notice of Settlement (U.D.D. 2006)), the case illustrates that 
it is conceivable that punitive damages can be awarded if the court accepts that the tortfeasor 
deliberately tried to injure the plaintiff or acted willfully or grossly negligent with a conscious 
disregard for the safety of others. 
4 There are, for instance, a number of examples of famous players who have made the move 
from the U.S. football competition to the English Premier League. In 1999 Colorado Rapids 
sold Marcus Stephen Hahnemann to Fulham. Goalkeeper Tim Howard left Metrostars for 
Manchester United in 2003. Fulham bought Clint Dempsey from New England Revolution in 
2007. Brad Guzan transferred from Chivas USA to Aston Villa in 2008. Finally, DeAndre 
Yedlin very recently swapped Seattle Sounders FC for Tottenham Hotspur. 
5 See for an extensive discussion: Cedric Vanleenhove & Jan De Bruyne, ‘Liability for 
Football Injuries and Enforcement in the EU – Will US Punitive Damages be Shown the Red 
Card in Europe?’ (2014) 14 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 50.  
damages are essentially a sum of money placed on top of the compensatory 
damages. They seek to punish the defendant for their outrageous misconduct 
and to deter him and others from similar misbehaviour in the future.6 The 
foundational requirement for punitive damages is the infringement of a legally 
protected interest.7 In order to obtain punitive damages, the plaintiff must have 
suffered actual damage and must provide sufficient evidence thereof. There is 
thus no separate cause of action for punitive damages.8 However, the fact that 
the defendant has acted in an unlawful manner does not suffice for punitive 
damages to be awarded. The conduct in question must involve a degree of 
aggravation.9 In this regard, the Restatement of Torts emphasises that “punitive 
damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the 
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others”.10  
It is thus required that a player’s conduct on the football pitch involves a degree 
of aggravation. However, such behaviour is not always easy to establish. 
Violent physical contact is often part of the game in contact sports such as 
football or rugby and sometimes even encouraged.11 Participants assume to a 
certain extent the risk of physical injury which is inherent in playing such 
violent sports.12 Injuries incurred by professional football players due to an 
                                                 
6 See in this regard: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary  (9th edn, Thomson/West 
2009) 175; Gabrielle Nater-Bass,  ‘U.S.-Style Punitive Damages Awards and their 
Recognition and Enforcement in Switzerland and Other Civil-Law Countries’ (2003) 4 DAJV 
Newsletter 154.  
7 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 567. 
8 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 567, 569.  
9 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 585; Lotte Meurkens, ‘The punitive damages debate in 
Continental Europe: food for thought’ in Lotte Meurkens & Emily Nordin (eds.), The Power 
of Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing Out? (Intersentia 2012) 7.  
10 Restatement of Torts, § 908. Across the different U.S. States, various terminology is 
employed to express this required high standard of misconduct: “egregious”, “reprehensible”, 
“bad faith”, “fraud”, “malice”, “oppression”, “outrageous”, “violent”, “wanton”, “wicked” and 
“reckless”.  
11 Michael F. Taxin, ‘The Changing Evolution of Sports: Why Performance Enhancing Drug 
Use Should Be Considered in Determining Tort Liability of Professional Athletes’ (2004) 14 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 817, 819 & 825-826; Daniel E. Lazaroff, ‘Torts & 
Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During Competition’ 
(1990) 7 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 191, 194. See for example: Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 
A.2d 332, 337 (Conn. 1997).  
12 See for example: Nydegger v. Don Bosco Preparatory High School, 495 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). See for a discussion: Richard J. Hunter Jr., ‘An “Insider's” Guide 
to the Legal Liability of Sports Contest Officials’ (2005) 15 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 369, 373.  
opponent’s tackle will, therefore, not often result in civil litigation.13 Despite 
these restrictions, punitive damages have already been claimed and awarded at 
several occasions in cases of (professional) sport liability.14 If an injured 
football player decides to file a law suit against the opponent-tortfeasor in the 
U.S., he can base his claims on several grounds.15 One of these grounds in 
cases of professional sports liability is recklessness.16 Recklessness is a state 
of mind in which a person does not care about the consequences of his or her 
actions.17 It can occur when the defendant acted with “reckless disregard of 
[the plaintiff’s] safety”.18 Intention is another ground on which claims for 
recovery can be founded. Intentional wrongdoing involves claims that are 
based on a deliberate interference with another person either by threats of 
physical contact or directly through the physical contact itself.19 An intentional 
                                                 
13 Jeffrey Citron & Mark Abelman, ‘Civil Liability in the Arena of Professional Sports’ (2003) 
36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 193, 194-195; Chris J. Carlsen & Matthew Shane Walker, ‘Note, The Sports 
Court: A Private System to Deter Violence in Professional Sports’ (1982) 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
399, 400-402 & 412-413; Erica K. Rosenthal, ‘Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability 
in Sports for Safety-Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play’ (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 
2631, 2631-2632; Donald T. Meier, ‘Primary Assumption of Risk and Duty in Football 
Indirect Injury Cases: A Legal Workout From the Tragedies on the Training Ground for 
American Values’ (2002) 2 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 80, 153.   
14 See for example: Polonich v. A.P.A. Sports, No. 74635 (E.D. Mich. filed Nov. 10, 1982); 
Tomjanovich v. California Sports, No. H-78–243, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9282 (S.D. Tex. 
1979). See for a discussion of the cases: Wyatt M. Hicks, ‘Preventing and Punishing Player-
to-Player Violence in Professional Sports: The Court System versus League Self-Regulation’ 
(2001) 11 J. Legal Aspects Sport 209, 222; John F. Carroll, ‘Torts in Sports – ‘I'll See You in 
Court!’’ (1983) 16 Akron L. Rev. 537, 539; Citron & Abelman (n 13) 199; Michael K. Zitelli, 
‘Unnecessary Roughness: When On-field Conduct Leads to Civil Liability in Professional 
Sports’ (2010) 8 Willamette Sport L.J. 1, 6-7; Gil B. Fried, ‘Punitive Damages and Corporate 
Liability Analysis in Sport Litigation’ (1998) 9 Marq. Sports L. J. 45.     
15 See for an extensive overview of case law with further references: Rosenthal (n 13) 2647.  
16 Taxin (n 11) 823; Ray Yasser, ‘In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant 
to Another: Why Can't Participants be Required to be Reasonable’ (1995) 5 Seton Hall J. Sport 
Law 253, 254-255 & 257-262. See for an in-depth discussion on the standard of intention or 
recklessness with further references to case law: Adam Epstein, Sports Law (1st edn, Cengage 
Learning 2012) 118-119; Lazaroff (n 11) 198-205; Rosenthal (n 13) 2648-2653.   
17 Garner (n 6) 1277. In this regard, Section 500 of the Restatement Second of Torts stipulates 
that “the actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or 
intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason 
to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates 
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater 
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent”. 
18 Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. and Charles Clark, 601 F.2d 516, 524 (1979); Nabozny 
v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975); Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 
(La. Ct. App. 1976); Robert J. Gauvin v. Richard Clark, 404 Mass. 450, 454 (Mass. 1989).  
19 Citron & Abelman (n 13) 198-199; Yasser (n 16) 255-256.  
tort requires the actor to have intended to cause the harm which resulted from 
the act.20  
In sum, a football player who suffers shocking and career-threatening injuries 
might be able to recover damages when he establishes that the defendant either 
acted with reckless disregard of the former’s safety or with the intention to 
cause him physical injuries. The crushing tackles discussed in this article often 
qualify as reckless, intentional or committed with disregard for the safety and 
interests of the plaintiff. As a consequence, punitive damages could be 
awarded by a U.S. court.21 
 
ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE EU: 
CURRENT SITUATION 
Given the many options the football market offers players to develop a career 
abroad, it is possible that the tortfeasor transfers to a club in the EU leaving no 
assets behind and rendering enforcement outside of the U.S. indispensable if 
any money is to be recovered. The question of the enforceability of U.S. 
punitive damages in the EU, therefore, holds a high level of relevance for 
sports law practice. 
In absence of a treaty for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments 
between the EU (or its Member States) and the U.S., national rules of private 
international law determine the requirements for enforcement. The 
compensatory damages awarded will generally not pose many concerns in the 
European Union. The punitive damages granted by the American court, on the 
other hand are more complicated. Fortunately, the Supreme Courts of four 
major EU Member States – Germany, Italy, Spain and France – have ruled on 
the enforceability of U.S. punitive damages. These nations are significant in 
                                                 
20 Zitelli (n 14) 2-3. See for example: Moser v. Ratinoff, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 206 (Ct. App. 
2003); Averill v. Luttrell, 311, S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ap. 1957).  
21 See for an extensive discussion and further references: Vanleenhove & De Bruyne (n 5) 51-
58.  
terms of population22 and economy23 as well as regards to the level and 
attraction of their highest football league. 
The sparse case law in the EU on the topic indicates that the outcome of the 
request for enforcement of the punitive award depends on the requested 
national court’s interpretation of the public policy exception. Contrariety to 
public policy is a ground for refusal of enforcement in all four selected EU 
Member States. The notion of public policy should be understood as 
international public policy. In private international law, a condensed form of 
public policy, namely international public policy, comes to the foreground.24 
This derivative from domestic public policy contains only the most 
fundamental values of the forum and is, therefore, narrower in scope than its 
internal counterpart. A legal system is required to be more tolerant in cross-
border matters than in purely domestic affairs.25 Despite its name, international 
public policy is a purely national concept.26 
All cases regarding the enforcement of U.S. punitive damages in the EU were 
centred around this ground of refusal but resulted in different outcomes.27 As 
to the four selected EU countries, two divergent attitudes can be discerned. On 
the one hand, the Supreme Court judgments in Germany (John Doe v. Eckhard 
Schmitz) and Italy (Parrott v. Fimez) have demonstrated a clear distrust 
towards American punitive damages. The concept of punitive damages is 
considered contrary to the fundamental separation of criminal and private law. 
These nations are wary of punitive damages because they are administered in 
                                                 
22 See for an overview of the population in EU Member States: <http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm>. 
23 The figures of the year 2013 are available on the website of the International Monetary Fund: 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys – World Economic 
Outlook Database, October 2013 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx>.  
24 Vincent Heuzé & Pierre Mayer, Droit international privé (8th edn, L.G.D.J 2004) 149, no. 
205; Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law – Justice, Pluralism 
and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (1st edn, CUP 
2009) 275-277; Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ 
(2008) 4 J. Private Int. Law 201, 203; Patrick Bernard, ‘Further developments for qualification 
of foreign judgments for recognition and enforcement in France: the test for punitive damage 
awards’ (2011) IBA 16, 18.  
25 Benjamin Janke & François-Xavier Licari, ‘Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France 
after Fountaine Pajot’ (2012) 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 775, 792.  
26 Jacob Dollinger, ‘World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of 
Laws’ (1982) 17 Tex. Int'l L. J. 167, 170.  
27 See for a more extensive analysis: Vanleenhove & De Bruyne (n 5) 58-80. 
civil proceedings but pursue objectives which are traditionally the focus of 
criminal law. Punitive damages are also held to be anathema to the principle 
of strict compensation and are seen as resulting in an unjust enrichment of the 
plaintiff. These findings led both courts to the conclusion that U.S. punitive 
damages violate their respective international public policy and should, 
therefore, be turned down for enforcement.28  
In contrast, the highest civil courts in Spain (Miller v. Alabastres) and France 
(Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot) have moved away from this 
conservative view and have adopted a more embracing stance on the 
contentious remedy of punitive damages. Instead of declaring the concept itself 
incompatible with international public policy, they have shifted their attention 
to an investigation of the amount awarded by the U.S. court.29 The fundamental 
rejection of the institution in se was replaced by a tolerance check in the form 
of an ‘excessiveness test’ on the basis of the quantum of punitive damages 
granted by the American court. In Spain, the end result was the acceptance of 
U.S. treble damages, i.e.  a form of punitive damages achieved by trebling the 
compensatory award (one third of treble damages thus stands for compensatory 
damages while two-thirds of the award represents punitive damages).30 In a 
French case worth USD 1.391.650,12 in compensatory damages, punitive 
damages as such were accepted, but USD 1.460.000 was deemed excessive.31 
The described schism leads to the realisation that the location of the 
wrongdoer’s new club will play a vital role in the enforcement chances of an 
American judgment for punitive damages. The likelihood of obtaining the 
                                                 
28 For Germany: German Supreme Court 4 June 1992, John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, BGHZ 
118, 312, NJW 1992, 3096, RIW 1993, 132, ZIP 1992, 1256 (English translation of the 
relevant parts of the judgment by Gerhard Wegen & James Sherer, ‘Germany: Federal Court 
of Justice decision concerning the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments awarding 
punitive damages’ (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1320, 1329. For Italy: Italian Supreme Court 19 January 
2007, Parrott v. Fimez, no. 1183, Rep Foro it 2007 v Delibazione no. 13 and v Danni Civili 
no. 316; Corr. Giur., 2007, 4, 497; Italian Supreme Court 8 February 2012, Soc Ruffinatti v 
Oyola-Rosado, no. 1781/2012, Danno resp 2012, 609. 
29 For Spain: Spanish Supreme Court 13 November 2001, Miller v. Alabastres, exequatur no. 
2039/1999, Aedipr 2003, 914. For France: French Supreme Court 1 December 2010, 
Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, no. 09-13303, Dalloz 2011, 423. 
30 Spanish Supreme Court 13 November 2001, Miller v. Alabastres, exequatur no. 2039/1999, 
Aedipr 2003, 914. 
31 French Supreme Court 1 December 2010, Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, 
no. 09-13303, Dalloz 2011, 423. 
amount of U.S. punitive damages in Germany and Italy is very low. The odds 
of getting punitive damages enforced in Spain and France is undoubtedly much 
higher but it is extremely difficult to predict the tolerance level of the national 
judges.32  Instead of revisiting the past cases, this article takes a normative slant 
by looking at the future. In the following parts it is first argued that European 
courts should accept the concept of punitive damages and then a framework 
that can assist the court when reviewing the excessiveness of the punitive 
damages is formulated.   
 
CHOOSING SIDES: PERSISTENT REFUSAL OR PRINCIPLED 
ACCEPTANCE? 
European courts should not treat U.S. punitive damages as, in themselves, 
contrary to international public policy.33 The traditional interpretation of 
international public policy, as rejecting the concept of punitive damages, does 
not reflect the legal reality. It cannot be sustained that the outright rejection of 
the remedy of punitive damages is warranted under international public policy. 
In this article it is asserted that Member States’ courts should not refuse the 
enforcement of U.S. punitive damages because their own legal systems contain 
private law instruments akin to punitive damages or pursuing identical or 
similar goals. In such a context, it seems problematic to employ the 
international public policy exception to reject foreign punitive damages in 
private international law cases. The international public policy test should be 
restricted to an excessiveness (or proportionality) check of the American 
punitive damages.34  
The legal systems of France, Spain, Italy and Germany contain private law 
instruments which resemble punitive damages or which pursue the same goals 
                                                 
32 See for an extensive discussion of the enforcement of punitive damages in the different EU 
Member States: Vanleenhove & De Bruyne (n 5) 58-81. 
33 Nater-Bass (n 6) 160  
34 François-Xavier Licari, ‘Prendre les punitive damages au sérieux: propos critiques sur un 
refus d’accorder l’exequatur à une décision californienne ayant alloué des dommages intérêts 
punitifs’ (2010) 137 Journal du droit international 1230, 1262. 
of punishment and/or prevention.35 An argument of internal legal coherence 
then leads to the acceptance of U.S. punitive damages at the enforcement stage. 
When a legal system itself contains punitive-like remedies in private law, it 
cannot declare punitive damages unenforceable by using the international 
public policy escape clause.36 Member States would be guilty of legal 
hypocrisy if they were to reject U.S. punitive damages as violating 
international public policy while at the same time acknowledging or condoning 
similar instruments in their substantive law.37  
 
PROPOSAL FOR GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Although this article supports the compatibility of U.S. punitive damages with 
international public policy, the openness is by no means unbridled. There is 
still another requirement that acts as a safety valve: the punitive damages 
award should not be excessive. In the following paragraphs, a set of guidelines 
as to how this excessiveness check should be applied is formulated. These 
suggested guidelines are derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional 
constraints on punitive damages as well as from the few cases concerning the 
enforcement of punitive damages in the four selected EU Member States. The 
                                                 
35 In Spain, for instance, Article 123 of the Ley General de la Seguridad Social (General Act 
on Social Security) provides that when an employee has suffered a labour accident or an 
occupational disease which was caused by faulty equipment in a workplace without obligatory 
safety devices or where safety and hygiene measures were not observed, the benefits paid out 
(by the state) to the employee will be increased by 30 to 50% depending on the seriousness of 
the employer’s wrongdoing. A penalty clause is another example. The clause leads to the party 
failing to perform his obligation or failing to do it properly having to pay an amount of money 
as penalty to the other party. The clause is intended to encourage performance or, put 
differently, to deter the party from breaching the contract. The party requesting payment of the 
penalty does not have to prove the existence of any real damage. The (indirect) penal effect of 
the clause is thus obvious. See in this regard: Article 339 of the German Civil Code, Article 
1226 of the French Civil Code, Article 1154 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 1382 of the 
Italian Civil Code.  
36 Volker Behr, ‘Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards 
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts’ (2003) 78 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 105, 153; 
Madeleine Tolani, ‘U.S. Punitive Damages Before German Courts: A Comparative Analysis 
with Respect to the Ordre Public’ (2011) 17 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 185, 207; Francesco 
Quarta, ‘Foreign Punitive Damages Decisions and Class Actions in Italy’ in Duncan Fairgrieve 
& Eva Lein (eds.), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (OUP 2012) 275-276.   
37 Jessica J. Berch, ‘The Need for Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards by the 
European Union’ (2010) 19 Minn. J. Int'l L. 55, 77; Csongor István Nagy, ‘Recognition and 
enforcement of US judgments involving punitive damages in continental Europe’ (2012) 30 
N.I.P.R. 4, 11.    
objective of the proposed framework for European judges is to promote a 
uniform and receptive standpoint regarding the enforcement of this common 
law remedy by offering concrete tools for European courts to separate 
acceptable punitive damages from the intolerable ones, thereby contributing to 
legal certainty. Football players who have suffered from tackles and have 
recovered punitive damages in the U.S. will have a clearer picture of what to 
expect at the enforcement stage in the EU. Although the guidelines discussed 
in the following paragraphs are valid for any type of U.S. punitive damages 
award, they are applied to the specific situation of a punitive award for physical 
harm in football where possible. The recommendations set out are thus not 
only relevant from a conceptual and academic point of view but are also 
practically significant for the football industry. 
First, an obvious yet important overarching reminder: refusal of enforcement 
should remain exceptional. The violation of (international) public policy forms 
a justification for a refusal to enforce the foreign judgment.38 However, this 
safety valve mechanism should only operate in the most compelling 
circumstances.39 Frequent refusals to grant enforcement on the basis of 
(international) public policy would add to the development of anarchy in 
international affairs.40 The escape clause should be reserved for extreme 
cases.41 When deciding on the enforceability of an American punitive damages 
award, courts in the European Union should thus lean towards acceptance 
rather than rejection. 
Second, the compensatory damages awarded to the prevailing party do not 
pose any enforcement concerns and should be enforced.42 Compensation of the 
victim is the foundational objective of civil liability systems in the European 
                                                 
38 John Kuhn Bleimaier, ‘The Doctrine of Comity in Private International Law’ (1979) 24 
Cath. Law. 327, 330.  
39 Bleimaier (n 38) 330-331. 
40 Bleimaier (n 38) 331. 
41 See for an application of this principle in Germany: Joachim Zekoll, ‘The Enforceability of 
American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of 
Justice’ (1992) 30 Colum. J. Transnat' L. 641, 646; Volker Behr, ‘Myth and Reality of Punitive 
Damages in Germany’ (2005) 24 J.L. & Com. 197, 204; Tolani (n 36) 201; Hartwin Bungert, 
‘Enforcing U.S. Excessive and Punitive Damages Awards in Germany’ (1993) 27 Int'l Law. 
1075, 1079.  
42 Olivier Cachard, ‘Le contrôle juridictionnel des jugements étrangers ordonnant des Punitive 
Damages’ (2013) Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires 140.  
Union.43 The compensatory damages are not in jeopardy by the presence of 
punitive damages in the judgment. However, it is required that the judgment 
clearly identifies the compensatory damages because the prohibition of 
révision au fond (prohibition of a review on the merits) prevents a court from 
reducing the global amount of (unspecified) damages a foreign court has 
awarded.44 Even if the compensatory damages are very high in comparison to 
the compensation standards of the requested forum, they should be accepted 
for enforcement. For instance, the German Supreme Court accepted in John 
Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz that the damages for pain and suffering, which are 
very relevant in the context of football injuries, could be enforced even though 
their amount was very high to German standards.45 
Third, it is submitted that courts in the European Union should keep in mind 
that some punitive awards (partly) pursue a compensatory function. Although 
it seems counterintuitive, compensation can indeed be one of the possible 
reasons why an American court grants punitive damages to the plaintiff. In the 
United States, punitive damages occasionally compensate for losses that are 
difficult to prove or for losses that are not covered by other types of damages. 
Punitive damages can also serve as a means to deprive the defendant of the 
gains he accumulated through his wrongful conduct.46 The compensatory 
objective of punitive damages should not pose any problem under international 
public policy because making the victim whole is the cornerstone upon which 
private laws in the European Union are based. Enforcing that compensatory 
portion of a punitive award should, therefore, be encouraged. 
                                                 
43 Walter Van Gerven, Jeremy Lever, Pierre Larouche, Tort Law (Hart Publishing 2000) 770. 
See for a general discussion of the principles of tort law in Europe: Cees Van Dam, European 
Tort Law (2nd edn, OUP 2013).  
44 Nathalie Meyer Fabre, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments in France – Recent 
Developments’ (2012) The International Dispute Resolution News 6, 9; Nathalie Meyer Fabre 
N, ‘Enforcement Of U.S. Punitive Damages Award in France: First Ruling Of The French 
Court Of Cassation In X. v. Fountaine Pajot, December 1, 2010’ (2011) 26 Mealey’s 
International Arbitration Report 1, 4.  
45 BGH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, 3100-3102. 
46 Wolfgang Wurmnest, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in 
Germany’ (2005) 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 175, 196-197; Nater-Bass (n 6) 156; Gerhard Wegen 
& James Sherer, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of US Punitive Damages Judgments in 
Germany – A Recent Decision of the German Federal Court of Justice’ (1993) Int'l Bus. Law 
485, 486; Andre R. Fiebig,‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Punitive Damage Awards in 
Germany: Recent Developments’ (1992) 22 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 635, 649.  
In John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, the German Supreme Court mentioned the 
possibility of enforcing the compensatory portion of a punitive award.47 The 
California Superior Court had awarded the plaintiff USD 350.260 in 
compensation and USD 400.000 in punitive damages. It had allocated 40% of 
the entire award to compensate the plaintiff’s attorney. Germany’s highest civil 
court decided that it would allow the enforcement of punitive damages if and 
to the extent that the punitive award serves a compensatory function.48 The 
Bundesgerichtshof referred to the lawyer’s fees which are in principle not 
recoverable given the American rule on costs (to be contrasted with the English 
rule on costs). Awarding legal fees through punitive damages enables the 
plaintiff to achieve full compensation.49 The fact that the American court had 
indicated its desire to transfer these legal fees to the losing party could have 
made it possible to enforce these fees. However, the German Supreme Court 
required that the foreign court clearly states its intention to charge this cost 
against the punitive damages. It held that the California Superior Court had not 
fulfilled this requirement because it had granted 40% of the entire award to the 
plaintiff’s counsel. The Bundesgerichtshof could not find sufficient evidence 
in the California judgment or in the transcript to substantiate the claim that the 
punitive damages were awarded to cover the legal costs incurred by the 
plaintiff. It could not exclude the possibility that the compensatory damages 
included an element addressing those costs.50,51 
The approach taken by the German Supreme Court is commendable. A 
requested court should accept punitive damages to the extent they fulfil a 
compensatory function. The foreign judgment should, however, explicitly 
identify the court’s intention to attach a compensatory function to the punitive 
award. It should also indicate which numerical part of the punitive damages is 
to be used for this compensatory purpose. This reasoning does not only apply 
to legal fees but to any form of loss. In essence, any disadvantage that the 
foreign court clearly deems recoverable via (a part of) the punitive damages 
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award should be enforced in the European Union. In light of the American rule 
on costs, legal fees will be the most common and important form of 
compensation to be recovered via punitive damages awards.      
The facts of the Italian Supreme Court Parrott v. Fimez case also demonstrate 
the necessity of a clear distinction (within the punitive damages awarded) 
between the amount pursuing compensatory aims and the portion seeking real 
punitive ends. The District Court of Jefferson County in Alabama awarded the 
American plaintiff USD 1.000.000 without specifying the nature of the award. 
The Venice Court of Appeal classified the award as punitive52 (the Italian 
Supreme Court later indicated that this factual finding cannot be reversed53). 
The Alabama wrongful death statute applied to the traffic accident in which 
the plaintiff’s son lost his life. Under that legislation, compensatory damages 
cannot be recovered and only punitive damages can be obtained. The Supreme 
Court of Alabama clarified, however, that the punitive damages in such 
wrongful death cases pursue punitive as well as compensatory objectives.54 
Even if the Venice Court of Appeal would have been aware of the dual 
intentions of the Alabama wrongful death statute and would have been willing 
to enforce the compensatory portion of the award, it would have been unable 
to do so due to the prohibition of révision au fond. The enforcing court cannot 
ascertain the motives behind the award if the foreign court has not provided 
clear and comprehensible information itself. Although a compensatory 
element might be hidden in a punitive award, the rendering court’s lack of 
identification ties the hands of the requested court. If the requested court were 
to examine the punitive award and were to differentiate the individual grounds 
that make up the overall amount of punitive damages, the prohibition of review 
of the merits would be violated.55 
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Fourth, European judges should be wary of American punitive damages 
exceeding the compensatory damages by a factor 10 or more.56 When 
discussing tolerable levels of punitive damages for enforcement purposes, it is 
useful to refer back to the constitutional limits the U.S. system itself has placed 
on punitive damages awards. The United States Supreme Court in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore created three guideposts to help determine 
whether a punitive award is constitutionally excessive: (1) the reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the ratio between the punitive and 
compensatory damages awarded and (3) a comparison of the punitive damages 
to the criminal penalties that could be imposed for similar misconduct.57 The 
second guidepost brings some form of mathematical certainty into the 
assessment of excessiveness. 
In the dicta of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 
judgment, the United States Supreme Court expanded upon this second 
guidepost. It effectively laid down a 9:1 maximum ratio58 between punitive 
and compensatory damages by stating that “in practice, few awards exceeding 
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due-process”.59 The establishment of this upper 
limit indirectly affects European courts faced with a request for enforcement 
of an American punitive damages judgment. If the American legal system itself 
has identified double-digit ratios between punitive and compensatory awards 
as constitutionally suspect, it seems only logical that European judges should 
also treat this 9:1 ratio as an outer limit to be conformed with in order to make 
the judgment enforceable. It would be illogical to allow the enforcement of 
judgments that violate the federal Constitution in their country of origin. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not construe this bright line limit as a 
rigid one. It had already held previously that an egregious case with small 
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economic damages could necessitate an upward deviation from the maximum 
ratio.60 In the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court added that ‘when compensatory damages 
are substantial, then a lesser ratio perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee’.61 In that 
case, it considered an award of USD 1.000.000 in compensatory damages to 
be substantial.62 The double-digit rule’s flexibility simultaneously acts as its 
Achilles’ heel. European courts can use the 9:1 ceiling as an important 
indication but should remain cautious as the U.S Supreme Court itself creates 
an opening for (both upwards and downwards) exceptions to the rule 
depending on the circumstances of the case. 
Fifth, a 1:1 ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages could 
be a workable starting point for the European excessiveness test. Member 
States’ courts are not obligated to transpose the relatively high American 9:1 
threshold as the maximum level of their tolerance. They are entitled to set a 
lower ratio as the boundary of excessiveness. The use of a ratio is prompted by 
the search for some form of (numerical) guidance for European judges. 
Linking the punitive damages to the compensatory damages contributes to 
foreseeability based on economically calculable factors.63 By attaching the 
acceptable amount of punitive damages to the compensatory damages, their 
effect becomes somehow more compensation-related, thereby narrowing the 
gap with the American legal system.64 
In Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot, the French Supreme Court 
indeed seems to have laid down a maximum ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages of 1:1. It rejected the punitive damages awarded by the 
California court because the punitive damages exceeded the compensatory 
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damages.65 Later French case law also seems to make use of this ratio.66 In 
John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, the German Supreme Court rejected the punitive 
damages for contrariety of the concept itself with international public policy. 
It, nevertheless, hypothetically took its reasoning a step further and subjected 
the punitive award to an excessiveness analysis. It held that the punitive 
damages granted would fail the proportionality test because they were higher 
in amount than the sum of all the compensatory damages.67 It thus suggested 
that a 1:1 ratio might be the outer limit of acceptable punitive damages under 
international public policy. In the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, one can 
equally find references to this ratio. The U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell pointed to ‘a lesser ratio 
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages’ as the ‘the outermost limit of 
the due process guarantee’ when the compensatory damages are substantial.68 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court established a strict 
1:1 ratio for federal maritime tort cases.69  
The suggested 1:1 ratio reflects a measure of reasonableness, striking the 
balance between not allowing enough of the foreign remedy and opening the 
European borders too liberally. Under this proposed ratio, the treble part of an 
American treble damages judgment, for instance, would be deemed 
unacceptable in light of international public policy. This would change the 
outcome of the Spanish Miller v. Alabastres case in which treble damages in 
their entirety were accepted. Interestingly, research in the United States has 
shown that in the vast majority of cases the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages lies between 0.88 and 0.98 to 1.70 A European standard 
of 1:1 thus seems to cover most of the American punitive damages judgments. 
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Sixth, two intervening factors capable of distorting the starting 1:1 ratio should 
be taken into consideration. The two factors which support an adaption of the 
ratio are the cases degree of connection to the requested forum 
(Inlandsbeziehung) and the interests protected by the award of punitive 
damages.   
According to the German theory of Inlandsbeziehung, the intensity of the 
international public policy exception depends on the case’s proximity to the 
forum.71,72 The notion of Inlandsbeziehung has been translated as “forum 
contacts”.73 It reflects the forum state’s interest in a close policing of its 
international public policy.74 There must be an interest in preventing the 
foreign judgment from being enforced.75 The closer the case’s connection to 
the requested court’s forum, the stronger the international public policy 
exception will be. The more connected the case (in terms of the facts and the 
parties) is to the territory of the requested state, the more interest the requested 
forum has to let the values of its own legal system influence the enforcement 
decision, and the less deference is given to the foreign court’s judgment. On 
the contrary, if the link to the forum is weaker, the forum’s interest in a 
thorough scrutiny is less and the level of tolerance toward the foreign judgment 
is higher. If the level of contacts to the forum being requested to enforce the 
judgment is low or non-existent, the application of the (international) public 
policy clause is softened and more tolerance should, therefore, be granted.76 In 
the case of punitive damages, this would mean that the amount deemed 
acceptable for enforcement should, all other factors being equal, be higher. The 
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European courts’ attitude with regard to U.S. punitive damages awards will 
thus also depend on the case’s factual connection to their territory. In terms of 
the scenario envisaged in this article, the connection to the enforcing forum 
will be limited. Even in the unlikely event that either the perpetrator or the 
victim of the horrendous football tackle on an American pitch have the 
nationality of the EU country where enforcement is sought, the level of 
Inlandsbeziehung will be on the low side of the spectrum, paving the way for 
higher levels of tolerance for punitive damages for physical harm in football. 
Both the German Supreme Court in John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz and the 
Spanish Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabastres referred to the concept of 
Inlandsbeziehung in their reasoning. The German Supreme Court explained 
that the proportionality test must take the remoteness of the underlying fact 
pattern into consideration and that the absence of sufficient contacts to 
Germany mandates that a greater tolerance be shown toward the foreign 
decision.77 In the case before the Bundesgerichtshof, the sexual abuse of the 
young victim for which punitive damages were awarded happened in the 
United States and both the victim and the perpetrator held American 
citizenship. Both resided in California at the moment when the crime 
occurred.78 The defendant only took up residence in Germany after his criminal 
conviction. The defendant’s German nationality was the only other factor 
connecting the case to Germany.79 The connection to the German forum was, 
therefore, very low. The public policy exception was, nevertheless, employed 
to block the enforcement of the California judgment. Despite the slight 
connection to the forum, the German Supreme Court did not tolerate the 
punitive award. This reveals the Bundesgerichtshof’s profound dislike for 
punitive damages at the time.80  
The Spanish Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabastres also attached importance 
to the case’s proximity to the forum. It stated that the court cannot lose sight 
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of the relation the matter presents to the Spanish forum when deciding whether 
there is a violation of public policy. This can be seen as a clear reference to the 
Inlandsbeziehung.81 The Spanish Supreme Court, however, did not apply the 
concept to the facts of the case (at least not explicitly in the judgment). It could 
be argued that there was at least a certain degree of Inlandsbeziehung in the 
factual pattern because the manufacture of the trademark infringing labels took 
place in Spain. 
Next to the connection to the forum, the interest at stake is the second 
consideration to be evaluated before international public policy can be 
activated. Inlandsbeziehung modulates the strength of the international public 
policy exception according to the closeness of the case to the forum. The 
stronger the interest protected by international public policy is, the less relevant 
the link to the forum must be to activate public policy.82 The opposite is also 
true. The degree of connection to the forum and the importance of the interest 
thus act as communicating vessels. 
It is perhaps in this regard that the second criterion of the proportionality 
analysis in Miller v. Alabastres can be given meaning. In that case, the Spanish 
Supreme Court attached particular importance to the nature of the interests 
protected. It found that not only the Spanish legal system but nations all over 
the world highly value the protection of intellectual property rights. Market 
economies globally set great store by the upholding of these rights.83 A 
common desire to protect the interest at stake might thus lead to more tolerance 
on the side of the enforcing court. Human rights in particular form an important 
interest to consider but also the safeguarding of the environment, freedom, 
dignity and legal certainty could be put forward as such strong interests.84 
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Arguably, the protection of the physical integrity of a sports player also fits the 
bill. Therefore, punitive damages for football injuries should be treated more 
amicably than most other categories of cases.  
Seventh, once the requested court has determined, with the help of the 
guidelines formulated, that the punitive award is not excessive, the judgment 
can be granted enforcement. More difficult is the situation in which the 
punitive damages award does not clear the excessiveness hurdle. The court is 
essentially faced with two options. The first: the court declares the whole 
punitive damages heading of the judgment unenforceable and enforces only 
the compensatory damages (if requested). The second: the court enforces the 
punitive damages up to the amount it deems to be tolerable in light of 
international public policy.  
The first scenario establishes an all-or-nothing approach: either all the punitive 
damages are enforced or all of them are rejected. Enforcement or rejection 
always relates to the whole punitive award. The second scenario allows the 
judge to reduce the amount of the punitive damages by determining the point 
at which the punitive damages become disproportionate, throwing out the 
excessive amount and enforcing the remaining non-excessive portion of the 
punitive award. 
The French Cour de cassation opted for the first approach in Fountaine Pajot. 
The French Supreme Court determined that the 1:1 ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages had been exceeded by the American judgment. This 
finding of excessiveness led to the rejection of the whole punitive damages 
award.85 Similarly, the German Bundesgerichtshof in John Doe v. Eckhard 
Schmitz spoke out against partitioning the punitive award by stating that the 
requested court should not be allowed to cut up the punitive damages awarded 
based on its own free judgment.86 
                                                 
85 Cass. Civ. 1st, 1 December 2010, Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, no. 09-
13303, Dalloz 2011, 423. 
86 BGH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, 3104; Patrick Nettesheim & Henning Stahl, ‘Recent 
Development – Bundesgerichtshof Rejects Enforcement of United States Punitive Damages 
Award’ (1993) 28 Tex. Int'l L. J. 415,  
423.  
The choice between both options stems from different interpretations of the 
prohibition of révision au fond. The first approach incorporates the idea that 
the arbitrary splitting of the punitive award would amount to forbidden 
révision au fond. Under this view, the judge is not allowed to chop the punitive 
award according to its own discretion in order to find the right balance but can 
only accept or reject the punitive award as a whole.87 Under the second 
approach the judge is allowed to cut the punitive award to a level which is 
acceptable to the forum. The prohibition to review the merits of an incoming 
judgment does not prevent the requested court to sever the acceptable amount 
of punitive damages from the excessive, non-tolerable part of the punitive 
award. Instead of having to rule on the head of punitive damages as a whole, 
the court is allowed to modify the amount to a numerical level compatible with 
the international public policy of the forum.88  
This article argues that a European court should be allowed to reduce the 
amount of the punitive damages to the level it finds admissible in light of 
international public policy. The all-or-nothing approach requiring the court to 
either take or leave the punitive award should not be followed. Cutting down 
the punitive award (to, for instance, our tentatively suggested 1:1 ratio) does 
not amount to révision au fond because the European court is not giving its 
opinion about the merits of the foreign case. The requested court is not 
reforming the foreign court’s examination of the facts of the case or second-
guessing the foreign court’s determination of the matter. It is not questioning 
whether the foreign decision was correct in fact and/or in law. By curtailing 
the amount of punitive damages, the requested court is merely stating that, for 
private international law purposes, the forum’s tolerance of this particular 
remedy goes up to a certain mathematical level but not beyond. 
The approval of the second approach brings a degree of fairness into the 
excessiveness analysis. Under the all-or-nothing approach, one excess dollar 
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could theoretically be the difference between being able to enforce all of the 
punitive damages or none of them. Withholding a large punitive award based 
on the presence of a small excessive amount of punitive damages would be a 
denial of justice and an unjust penalty for the plaintiff.89 The possibility of a 
partial enforcement of the punitive damages leads to fairer results for plaintiffs 
and defendants who are no longer subjected to a random spin of the wheel. 
Plaintiffs in American litigation can claim the amount they feel appropriate 
before the American courts without concern that they will be unable to enforce 
any of the punitive damages in Europe because the amount of punitive 
damages received is too high.  
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CONCLUSION 
The article examined the liability for football injuries in the U.S. and especially 
focused on the enforcement of a judgment containing punitive damages in a 
number of EU Member States. A football player who dangerously tackles an 
opponent and thereby causes shocking and career-threatening injuries risks to 
be sued on two major grounds, namely recklessness and intention. A claimant 
will be able to recover damages when he establishes that the defendant either 
acted with reckless disregard of the former’s safety or with the intention to 
cause him physical injuries. So-called crushing or horrifying tackles in football 
can meet the requirements of reckless or intentional conduct which in turn 
might result in awarding punitive damages.   
The availability of punitive damages for football injuries in the United States 
raises the question whether awards for such damages will be enforced in the 
European Union. In Europe, U.S. punitive awards are subjected to a patchwork 
of national laws governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments. On 
the basis of their (international) public policy exception, EU Member States 
have adopted divergent attitudes towards American punitive damages awards. 
The Supreme Courts of Germany and Italy have outright rejected punitive 
damages in enforcement proceedings because they argued that the concept 
itself violates international public policy. France and Spain, on the other hand, 
have accepted the compatibility of punitive damages with international public 
policy. Both the Spanish and the French Supreme Court subsequently 
investigated the amount awarded by the foreign court. Although punitive 
damages as such no longer trigger alarm bells during the enforcement process, 
punitive damages of an excessive nature are still problematic in light of the 
international public policy exception. 
The latter progressive approach is to be preferred. A dismissal of punitive 
damages on principle fails to recognise the legal reality in the Member States. 
The private law systems of the Member States contain remedies and 
institutions which deviate from the strictly compensatory agenda of tort law. 
Their pursuit of deterrence and/or punishment puts pressure on the exclusively 
compensatory function of the civil liability system. The traditional refusal to 
enforce U.S. punitive damages should, therefore, be replaced by an 
examination of the amount of the punitive damages awarded. 
In that regard, this article advanced a number of concrete guiding principles 
that European judges can work with when confronted with American punitive 
damages judgments. These rules are not all-encompassing or exhaustive but 
can help requested courts to make well-informed decisions when tackling 
requests for enforcement of American punitive damages for football injuries. 
It is hoped these guidelines will contribute to the perceived paradigm shift 
regarding the enforcement of U.S. punitive damages in the European Union. 
 
